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Abstract
We consider the problem of private computation of approximate Heavy Hitters. Alice and
Bob each hold a vector and, in the vector sum, they want to find the B largest values along
with their indices. While the exact problem requires linear communication, protocols in the
literature solve this problem approximately using polynomial computation time, polylogarithmic
communication, and constantly many rounds. We show how to solve the problem privately with
comparable cost, in the sense that nothing is learned by Alice and Bob beyond what is implied by
their input, the ideal top-B output, and goodness of approximation (equivalently, the Euclidean
norm of the vector sum). We give lower bounds showing that the Euclidean norm must leak by
any efficient algorithm.
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1 Introduction
Secure and private multiparty computation has been studied for several decades, starting with [20,
5]. Any protocol for computing a function of several inputs can be converted, gate-by-gate, to a
private protocol, in which no party learns anything from the protocol messages other than what
can be deduced from the function’s input/output relation. The computational overhead is at most
polynomial in the size of the inputs.
In recent years, however, input sizes in many problems have grown to the point where “poly-
nomial computational overhead” is too coarse a measure; both computation and communication
should be minimized. For example, absent privacy concerns, applications may require that a proto-
col uses at most polylogarithmic communication. General-purpose secure multiparty computation
may blow up communication exponentially, so additional techniques are needed. In one theoretical
approach, individual protocols are designed for functions of interest such as database lookup (the
private information retrieval problem [8, 17, 6]) and building decision trees [18]. Another approach,
the breakthrough [19], converts any protocol into a private one with little communication blowup,
but imposes a computational blowup that may be exponential.
The approach we follow, which was introduced in [10], is to substitute an approximate function
for the desired function. Many functions of interest have good approximations that can be computed
efficiently both in terms of computation and communication. A caveat is that the traditional
definition of privacy is no longer appropriate. Instead, a protocol π computing an approximation
f˜ to a function f is a private approximation protocol [10] for f if
• π is a private protocol for f˜ in the traditional sense that the messages of π leak nothing
beyond what is implied by inputs and f˜ , and,
• the output f˜ leaks nothing beyond what is implied by inputs and f .
Several examples were given in [10]. Another important example, crucial to this article and the
first non-trivial example to achieve polylogarithmic communication and polynomial computation,
was given in [14]. There, Alice and Bob have vectors a and b of length N , taking integer values in
the range [−M,M ]. Their goal is to approximate the Euclidean norm of the sum, ‖a+ b‖2. The
authors show how to compute an estimate ‖a+ b‖∼ such that, if k is a security parameter,
• 11+ǫ‖a+ b‖2 ≤ ‖a+ b‖∼ ≤ ‖a+ b‖2.
• The protocol requires poly(k log(M)N/ǫ) local computation, poly(k log(M) log(N)/ǫ) com-
munication, and O(1) rounds.
• No party learns more from the protocol messages than can be deduced from the approximate
output ‖a+ b‖∼ and the relevant party’s input, and no party learns more from the output
‖a+ b‖∼ than can be deduced from the exact output ‖a+ b‖2.
We will make use of this result.
1.1 Our Results
Each of two parties has a vector, a and b, and they want a summary for the vector sum c = a+ b.
First, we consider the Euclidean approximate heavy hitters problem, in which there is a parameter,
B, and the players ideally want copt, the B largest terms in c, i.e., the B biggest values together
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with the corresponding indices. Unfortunately, finding copt exactly requires linear communication.
Instead, the players use polylogarithmic communication (and polynomial work and O(1) rounds)
to output a vector c˜ with ‖c˜− c‖2 ≤ (1 + ǫ)‖copt − c‖2. In our protocol, the players learn nothing
more than what can be deduced from copt and ‖c‖2. (We discuss below the significance of leaking
‖c‖2.) We can immediately use this result as black box for approximate sparse representations over
any orthonormal basis such as wavelet or Fourier, with similar costs. We can also use the result as
a black box for taxicab approximate heavy hitters, i.e., finding c˜ with ‖c˜− c‖1 ≤ (1+ ǫ)‖copt − c‖1,
leaking copt and ‖c‖2.
In the basic result, we give an at-most-B-term representation that is nearly as good (in the
Euclidean sense) as the best B-term representation and leaks no more than the best B-term repre-
sentation and the Euclidean norm. Leaking the Euclidean norm represents a weaker result than not
leaking the Euclidean norm, but (i) leaking ‖c‖2 is necessary in some circumstances and (ii) comput-
ing or approximating ‖c‖2 is desirable in some circumstances. First, we give a straightforward lower
bound showing that, for some (reasonable) values of parametersM,N, . . ., computing c˜ leaking only
copt requires Ω(N) communication. In fact, for some (artificial) classes of inputs, Ω(N) communica-
tion is needed unless ‖c‖2 itself is not only potentially leaked, but actually computed exactly. On the
other hand, one can regard the Euclidean norm as semantically interesting, so that we can regard
the top B terms together with the Euclidean norm as a compound, extended summary. In particu-
lar, since c˜ is computed, leaking ‖c‖2 is equivalent to leaking ‖c‖22− ‖c˜‖22 = ‖c˜− c‖22, i.e., the error
in our representation, which is a useful and common thing to want to compute. Our protocol indeed
can be modified to output an approximation ‖c˜− c‖∼ with ‖c˜− c‖2 ≤ ‖c˜− c‖∼ ≤ (1 + ǫ)‖c˜− c‖2,
so we can regard the protocol as solving two cascaded approximation problems: find a near-best
representation c˜, then find an approximation ‖c˜− c‖∼ to ‖c˜− c‖2. It is natural to expect a protocol
for c˜ to leak copt and a protocol for ‖c˜− c‖∼ to leak ‖c˜− c‖2; while lower bounds prevent that,
we can compute c˜ and ‖c˜− c‖∼ simultaneously and guarantee that, overall, we leak only copt and
‖c˜− c‖2.
We give a result for taxicab heavy hitters that produces an at-most-B term representation
that is nearly as good (in the taxicab sense) as the the best B-term representation and leaks no
more than the best B-term representation and the Euclidean norm. Thus we have shown that
the private Euclidean norm approximation can be used for non-Euclidean problems. Finally, we
also give a result for other orthonormal bases that involves little additional algorithmic or privacy
work, but demonstrates that the basic result can be applied in a variety of interesting applications.
It says that we provide an at-most-B term Fourier representation that is almost as good (in the
Euclidean sense) as the best B-term Fourier representation and leaks no more than the best B-term
representation and the Euclidean norm. The Fourier basis may be substituted by any orthonormal
basis, such as Hadamard or Wavelet.
1.2 Related Work
Other work in private communication-efficient protocols for specific functions includes the Private
Information Retrieval problem [8, 17, 6], building decision trees [18], set intersection and match-
ing [11], and k’th-ranked element [1].
The breakthrough [19] gives a general technique for converting any protocol into a private
protocol with little communication overhead. It is not the end of the story, however, because the
computation may increase exponentially.
Work in private approximations include [10] that introduced the notion as a conference paper
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in 2001 and gave several protocols. Some negative results were given in [13] for approximations to
NP-Hard functions; more on NP-hard search problems appears in [4]. Recently, [14] gives a private
approximation to the Euclidean norm that is central to our paper.
Statistical work such as [7] also addresses approximate summaries over large databases, but
differs from our work in many parameters, such as the number of players and the allowable com-
munication.
There are many papers that address the Heavy Hitters problem and sketching in general, in
a variety of contexts. Many of the needed ideas can be seen in [15] and other important papers
include [3, 2, 12, 9].
1.3 Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give preliminaries. In Section 3, we present our
main result. In Section 4, we present lower bounds.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Parameters and Notation
Fix parameters N,M,B, k, ǫ. We will consider two players, Alice and Bob, who will have inputs,
a and b respectively, that are vectors of length N taking integer values in the range −M to +M .
Throughout, we will be interested in summaries of size B for the vector c = a + b. For example,
in the main result, we are interested ideally in the largest B terms of c. A vector c is written
c = (c0, c1, c2, . . . , cN−1) =
∑
cjδj , where j is an index, cj is a value, δj is the vector that is 1 at
index j and 0 elsewhere, and cjδj , which can be implemented compactly and equivalently written
as the pair (j, cj), is a term, in which cj is the coefficient.
We compare terms by the magnitudes of their coefficients, braking ties by the indices. That
is, we will say that (j, cj) < (k, ck) if |cj | < |ck| or both |cj | = |ck| and j < k. Thus all terms are
strictly comparable. A heavy hitter summary is an expression of the form
∑
i∈Λ ηiδi. If |Λ| must
be at most B, then the best heavy hitter summary copt for a vector c occurs where {(i, ηi) : i ∈ Λ}
consists of the B largest terms.
The Euclidean norm of a is ‖a‖2 =
√∑
i a
2
i and the taxicab norm is ‖a‖1 =
∑
i |ai|. The
support supp(a) of a vector a is the set of indices where a is non-zero, {i : ai 6= 0}.
The parameter ǫ is a distortion parameter. We will guarantee summaries whose error is at most
the factor (1 + ǫ) times the error of the best possible summary.
The parameter k is a security and failure probability parameter. Algorithms will be expected
to succeed except with probability 2−k and 2−k will serve as an upper bound for the allowable
statistical distance between indistinguishable distributions.
We will be interested in protocols that use communication poly(B, log(N), k, log(M), 1/ǫ), local
computation poly(B,N, k, log(M), 1/ǫ), and number of rounds that is constant.
2.2 Approximate Data Summaries
In the heavy hitters problem, we are given parameters B and N and the goal is to find the B largest
terms in a vector c of length N . We will be interested in two approximate versions, parametrized
also by ǫ. In the approximate heavy hitters problem, we want a summary c˜ =
∑
i∈Λ ηiδi such that
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‖c˜− c‖ ≤ (1 + ǫ)‖copt − c‖, where the norms are, respectively, 2-norms (in the Euclidean approxi-
mate heavy hitters problem) and 1-norms (in the taxicab approximate heavy hitters problem).
In order to describe previous algorithms that are relevant to us, we first need some defini-
tions. Fix a vector c = (c0, c1, c2, . . . , cN−1) =
∑
0≤i<N ciδi, whose terms are t0 = (0, c0), t1 =
(1, c1), . . . , tN−1 = (N − 1, cN−1). Suppose the sequence i′0, i′1, . . . is a decreasing rearrangement of
c, i.e., ti′0 > ti′1 > · · · > ti′N−1 .
Definition 2.1 (Significant index.) Let I ⊆ [0, N) be a set of indices containing i. Then i is a
(I, θ)-significant index for c if and only if c2i ≥ θ
∑
j∈I |cj |2.
That is, an index is signficant if the corresponding value is large compared with all the values. In
some of the algorithms below, we will find the largest term (if it is sufficiently large), subtract it
off, then recurse on the residual signal. This motivates the following definitions.
Definition 2.2 (Significant index set.) Let I ⊆ [0, N) be a set of m indices containing i. Then I is
a θ-significant index set for c if and only if ∀j = 1 · · ·m, ti′j is a ([0, N)\{i′1, · · · , i′j−1}, θ)-significant
index.
That is, in a significant index set for c, the largest term has a significant index; after removing the
largest term, the new largest term has a significant index, etc. Note that there can be more than
one θ-significant index set for a given vector.
Definition 2.3 (Qualified index set.) Fix parameters ℓ and θ. The set Q = {i′0, i′1, . . . , i′m−1} is a
(ℓ, θ)-qualified index set for c if and only if
• m ≤ ℓ,
• {i′0, i′1, . . . , i′m−1} is a θ-significant index set, and
• {i′0, i′1, . . . , i′m−1, i′m} is NOT a θ-significant index set.
That is, a qualified index set consists of the largest possible length m for a prefix of i′0, i
′
1, . . . , i
′
m−1
such that, for each j < m, we have c2i′j
≥ θ(c2i′j + c
2
i′j+1
+ c2i′j+2
+ · · · + c2N−1). In particular,
if the terms happen to be in decreasing order to begin with, i.e., if |c0| > |c1| > · · ·, then a
qualified index set is {0, 1, 2, . . . ,m − 1} for the largest m such that, for each j < m, we have
c2j ≥ θ(c2j + c2j+1 + c2j+2 + · · · c2N−1).
Note that for each ℓ, θ, and vector c, there is only one (ℓ, θ)-qualified index set for c. We use
Qc,ℓ,θ to denote it. We sometimes write Qℓ,θ when c is understood.
The following are straightforward.
Proposition 2.4 For any θ1 < θ2, Qℓ,θ2 set is a subset of Qℓ,θ1.
Proposition 2.5 Fix parameters N,M,B, k, ǫ and vector c as above. If c˜ =
∑
i∈Qc,B, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)
ciδi,
then ‖c˜− c‖22 ≤ (1 + ǫ)‖copt − c‖22.
4
Proof: Assume without loss of generality that |c0| > |c1| > · · · and let q = |Qc,B, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)
|. If q = B,
then c˜ = copt and we are done. Otherwise we have
‖c˜− c‖22 =
∑
q≤i<B
|ci|2 + ‖copt − c‖22
≤ B|cq|2 + ‖copt − c‖22
≤ ǫ
1 + ǫ
‖c˜− c‖22 + ‖copt − c‖22,
whence (
1− ǫ
1 + ǫ
)
‖c˜− c‖22 ≤ ‖copt − c‖22.
The result follows.
The algorithms below will work from a linear sketch of a vector.
Definition 2.6 (Sketch of a vector.) Given a vector c, a linear sketch of c is Rc, where R is a
random matrix generated from a prescribed distribution, called the measurement matrix.
In our case, as is typical, the matrix R will be a pseudorandom matrix, that can be generated
from a short pseudorandom seed. We will use sketching for the norm estimation protocol, in
which the generator needs to be secure against small space, and a different measurement matrix in
the the non-private Euclidean Heavy Hitters protocol, where, e.g., pairwise independence suffices
for the pseudorandom number generator.
An algorithm in connection with the Euclidean approximate heavy hitter problem satisfying
the following is known:
Theorem 2.7 Fix parameters N,M,B, k, ǫ as above. Fix θ ≥ poly(log(N), log(M), B, k, 1/ǫ)−1.
There is a distribution on sketch matrices R and a corresponding algorithm that, from R and sketch
Rc of a vector c, outputs a superset of Qc,B,θ, in time poly(log(N), log(M), B, k, 1/ǫ).
In particular, the number or rows in R and the size of the output is bounded by the expression
poly(log(N), log(M), B, k, 1/ǫ) in accordance with the time bound on the algorithm.
Note that the algorithm returns a superset of Qc,B,θ but that even Qc,B,θ itself suffices for a
good approximation.
Proof: [sketch] One such algorithm is as follows. As in [12], one can estimate ci by c˜i = δ
T
i R
TRc±
(ǫ/B)‖c‖2 except with small probability, where R is a ±1-valued matrix with poly(log(N), B, 1/ǫ)
independent rows, each of which is a pairwise independent family. By repeating O(k) times and
taking a median, one can drive down the failure probability to 2−k. As in [12], one need not
estimate all the terms; rather, in time poly(log(N), log(M), B, k, 1/ǫ), one can find a set I of indices
that includes all terms with magnitude at least θ‖c‖2 (and possibly other terms). By adjusting
parameters, one can estimate such ci well enough as c˜i so that |c˜i − ci|2 ≤ (ǫ/B)‖c‖22. To get a
superset of a qualified set, subtract off the approximation to ciδi and repeat as long as new ci (or
better approximations to old ci) are found that are large compared with the residual vector. At
most O(log(MN)) repetitions are needed since, after O(log(MN)) repetitions, we have reduced
‖c‖22 from its initial value of at most M2N to its least possible positive value of 1.
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2.3 Privacy
Secure multiparty computation allows two or more parties to evaluate a specified function of their
inputs while hiding their inputs from each other. We work in the semi-honest model, which assumes
that the adversary is passive and can’t modify the behavior of corrupted parties. In particular, the
computation is only concerned with the information learned by the adversary, and not with the
effect misbehavior may have on the protocol’s correctness.
We briefly review private two-player protocols in the semi-honest model. A two-party com-
putation task is specified by a (possibly randomized) mapping g from a pair of inputs (a, b) ∈
{0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗ to a pair of outputs (c, d) ∈ {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗. Let π = (πA, πB) be a two-party pro-
tocol computing g. Consider the probability space induced by the execution of π on input x = (a, b)
(induced by the independent choices of random inputs rA, rB). Let view
π
A(x) (resp., view
π
B(x)) de-
note the entire view of Alice (resp., Bob) in this execution, including her input, random input,
and all messages she has received. Let outputπA(x) (resp., output
π
B(x)) denote Alice’s (resp., Bob’s)
output. Note that the above four random variables are defined over the same probability space.
Two distributions (or ensembles) D1 and D2 are said to be computationally indistinguishable with
security parameter k, D1 c≡ D2, if, whenever X1 ∼ D1 and X2 ∼ D2 and for any function C having
a circuit of size at most 2k, we have then |Pr(C(X1) = 1)− Pr(C(X2) = 1)| ≤ 2−k.
Definition 2.8 Let X be the set of all valid inputs x = (a, b). A protocol π is a private protocol
computing g if the following properties hold:
Correctness. The joint outputs of the protocol are distributed according to g(a, b). Formally,
{(outputπA(x), outputπB(x))}x∈X ≡ {(gA(x), gB(x))}x∈X ,
where (gA(x), gB(x)) is the joint distribution of the outputs of g(x).
Privacy. There exist probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms SA,SB, called simulators, such that:
{(SA(a, gA(x)), gB(x))}x=(a,b)∈X
c≡ {(viewπA(x), outputπB(x))}x∈X
{(gA(x),SB(b, gB(x))}x=(a,b)∈X
c≡ {(outputπA(x), viewπB(x))}x∈X
There are efficient general techniques:
Proposition 2.9 (General-Purpose Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) [20]) Two parties hold-
ing inputs x and y can privately compute any circuit C with communication and computation
O(k(|C|+ |x|+ |y|)), where k is a security parameter, in O(1) rounds.
Private approximation requires further discussion.
Definition 2.10 (Private Approximation Protocol ([10])) A two-party protocol π is a pri-
vate approximation protocol for a deterministic, common-output function g on inputs a and b if π
computes a (possibly randomized) approximation g˜ to g such that
• g˜ is a good approximation to g (in the appropriate sense)
• π is a private protocol for g˜ in the traditional sense.
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• (Functional Privacy.) There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S such that:
{S(g(x))}
x=(a,b)∈X
c≡ g˜(x).
In our case, g(a, b) will formally be the pair (copt, ‖c‖2) and g˜(a, b) will be c˜. We will informally say
that we “approximate copt leaking only copt and ‖c‖2,” since there is a simulator that takes copt and
‖c‖2 as input and simulates the approximate output c˜ and the protocol messages. Equivalently, one
could define g(a, b) to be the pair (copt, ‖copt − c‖) and define g˜(a, b) to be the pair (c˜, ‖c˜− c‖∼),
where ‖·‖∼ is an approximation to the Euclidean norm (see below).
In our case of a deterministic function to be output to both Alice and Bob, a (weakly) equivalent
definition is as follows, known as the “liberal” definition in [10]:
Definition 2.11 A two-party protocol π is a private approximation protocol for a deterministic,
common-output function g on inputs a and b in the liberal sense if π computes a (possibly random-
ized) approximation ĝ to g such that
• ĝ is a good approximation to g (in the appropriate sense)
• There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulators SA and SB such that:
{SA(a, g(x))}x=(a,b)∈X
c≡ {viewπA(x)}x∈X
{SB(b, g(x))}x=(a,b)∈X
c≡ {viewπB(x)}x∈X
Roughly speaking, the equivalence is as follows. Suppose there are simulators in the standard
definition. Then, putting ĝ = g˜, a simulator for the liberal defintion can be constructed by sim-
ulating ĝ(a, b) = g˜(a, b) from g(a, b) using the hypothesized simulator for functional privacy, then
simulating Alice’s view from ĝ(a, b) and a using the hypothesized simulator traditional simulator
for the protocol that computes g˜. In the other direction, suppose there is a simulator in the liberal
definition. Let τ be a transcript of Alice’s view except for input a. (As it turns out, it is not neces-
sary to include a in τ . If a is much longer than τ—as in our situation—we want to avoid including
a in τ in order to keep τ short.) Define g˜ = ĝ.τ to be ĝ with τ encoded into its low-order bits. We
assume that this kind of encoding into approximations can be accomplished without significantly
affecting the goodness of approximation; in fact, we will assume that the value represented does
not change at all, even if the “approximate” value is zero—that is, τ is auxiliary data rather than
an actual part of the value of g˜. Note that a protocol for ĝ also serves as a protocol for g˜. It is
trivial to simulate the messages of the protocol given a and g˜. Use the hypothesized simulator in
the liberal definition to show functional privacy.
We will use the technique of encoding into the low-order bits in our main result, which, formally,
will be proven in the standard definition. We remark that the norm estimation protocol from [14]
is presented in the liberal definition.
We will need the following standard definition.
Definition 2.12 (Additive Secret Sharing) An intermediate value x of a joint computation is
said to be secret shared between Alice and Bob if Alice holds r and Bob holds x− r, modulo some
large prime, where r is a random number independent of all inputs and outputs.
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The Private Sample Sum problem is as follows.
Definition 2.13 (Private Sample Sum) At the start, Alice holds a vector a of length N and
Bob holds a vector b. Alice and Bob also hold a secret sharing of an index i. At the end, Alice and
Bob hold a secret sharing of ai + bi.
That is, neither the index i nor the value ai + bi becomes known to the parties. Efficient protocols
for this can be found (or can be constructed immediately from related results) in [19, 10], under
various assumptions about the existence of Private Information Retrieval, such as in [6].
Proposition 2.14 There is a protocol private-sample-sum for the Private Sample Sum problem
that requires poly(N, k) computation, poly(log(N), k) communication, and O(1) rounds.
Our results also rely on the following protocol from [14], that privately approximates the Eu-
clidean norm of the vector sum.
Proposition 2.15 (Private l2 approximation) [14] Suppose Alice and Bob have integer-valued vec-
tors a and b in [−M,M ]N and let c = a+ b. Fix distortion ǫ and security parameter k. There is a
protocol norm estimation that computes an approximation ‖c‖∼ to ‖c‖2 such that
• 11+ǫ‖a+ b‖2 ≤ ‖a+ b‖∼ ≤ ‖a+ b‖2.
• The protocol requires poly(k log(M)N/ǫ) local computation, poly(k log(M) log(N)/ǫ) commu-
nication, and O(1) rounds.
• The protocol is a private approximation protocol for ‖c‖ in the sense of Definition 2.11.
Furthermore, the protocol’s only access to a and b is through the matrix-vector products Ra and Rb,
where R is a pseudorandom matrix known to both players.
3 Private Euclidean Heavy Hitters
We consider the setting in which Alice has signal a of dimension N , and Bob has signal b of the
same dimension. Let c = a+ b. Both parties want to learn a representation c˜ =
∑
t∈Tout
t such that
‖c− c˜‖22 ≤ (1 + ǫ)‖c− copt‖22 and such that at most copt and ‖c‖2 is revealed. A protocol is given
in Figure 1.
3.1 Analysis
First, to gain intuition, we consider some easy special cases of the protocol’s operation. For our
analysis, assume that the terms in c are already positive and in decreasing order, c0 > c1 > · · · >
cN−1 > 0. We will be able to find the coefficient value of any desired term, so we focus on the set
of indices. Let Iopt = {0, 1, 2, . . . , B − 1} denote the set of indices for the optimal B terms. Thus
Qc,B,θ ⊆ Qc,B, θ
1+ǫ
⊆ Iopt and Qc,B, θ
1+ǫ
⊆ I.
The ideal output is Iopt, though any superset of Qc,B,θ suffices to get an approximation with
error at most (1 + ǫ) times optimal. This includes the set I ⊇ Qc,B,θ which the algorithm has
recovered. The set IB of the largest B terms indexed by I contains Qc,B,θ, so IB is a set of at most
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private Euclidean heavy hitters
• Known structural parameters: N,M,B, ǫ, k, which determine θ = ǫ
B(1+ǫ) and B
′
• Individual inputs: vectors a and b, of length N , with integer values in the range [−M,M ].
• Output: With probability at least 1 − 2−k, a set Tout of at most B terms, such that∥∥c−∑t∈Tout t∥∥22 ≤ (1 + ǫ)
∥∥∥c−∑t∈Topt t
∥∥∥2
2
.
1. Exchange pseudorandom seeds (in the clear). Generate measurement matrices R1 and R2.
Alice locally constructs sketches R1a and R2a = (R
0
2a,R
1
2a, . . . R
B−1
2 a), where the measure-
ment matrix R1 is used for a non-private Euclidean Heavy Hitters and the measurement ma-
trix R2 = (R
0
2, R
1
2, . . . , R
B−1
2 ) is used for B independent repetitions of norm estimation.
Bob similarly constructs R1b and R2b.
2. Using general-purpose SMC, do
• Use an existing (non-private) Euclidean Heavy Hitters protocol to get, from R1a
and R1b, a secret-sharing of a superset I of Qc,B, θ
1+ǫ
, in which I has exactly B′ ≤
poly(log(N), log(M), B, k, 1/ǫ) indices. (Pad with arbitrary indices, if necessary.)
3. Use private-sample-sum to compute, from I, a, and b, secret-shared values for each index
in I. Let T denote the corresponding set of secret-shared terms. (Both the index and value
of each term in T is secret shared.) Enumerate I as I = {i0, i1, . . .} with ti0 > ti1 > · · ·.
4. Using SMC, do
• for j = 0 to B − 1
(a) From Rj2, R
j
2a,R
j
2b, t0, t1, . . . , tij−1 , sketch rj = c − (ti0 + ti1 + · · · + tij−1) as
Rj2rj = (R
j
2a+R
j
2b−Rj2(ti0 + ti1 + · · ·+ tij−1 )).
(b) use norm estimation to estimate ‖rj‖22 as ‖rj‖ 2∼, satisfying 11+ǫ‖rj‖22 ≤
‖rj‖ 2∼ ≤ ‖rj‖22.
(c) If |cij |2 < θ‖rj‖ 2∼, break (out of for-loop)
(d) Output tj
5. For technical reasons, encode the pseudorandom seeds for R1 and R2 into the low-order
bits of the output or (as we assume here) provide R1 and R2 as auxiliary output.
Figure 1: Protocol for the Euclidean Heavy Hitters problem
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B terms with error at most (1 + ǫ) times optimal. If |Qc,B,θ| = B, then IB = Qc,B,θ = Iopt, and IB
is a private and correct output.
The difficulty arises when |Qc,B,θ| < B, in which case some of IB may be arbitrary and should
not be allowed to leak. So the algorithm needs to find a private subset Iout with Qc,B,θ ⊆ Iout ⊆ IB .
The challenge is subtle. Let s denote |Qc,B,θ|. If the algorithm knew s, the algorithm could easily
output Qc,B,θ, which is the indices of the top s terms, a correct and private output. Unfortunately,
determining Qc,B,θ or s = |Qc,B,θ| requires Ω(N) communication (see Section 4), so we cannot
hope to find Qc,B,θ exactly. Non-private norm estimation can be used to find a subset Iout with
Qc,B,θ ⊆ Iout ⊆ Qc,B, θ
1+ǫ
⊆ Iopt, which is correct, but not quite private. Given |Iout|, the contents
of Iout ⊆ Iopt are indeed private, but the size of Iout is, generally, non-private. Fortunately, if we
use a private protocol for norm estimation, |Iout| remains private. We now proceed to a formal
analysis.
Theorem 3.1 Protocol private Euclidean heavy hitters requires poly(N, log(M), B, k, 1/ǫ)
local computation, poly(log(N), log(M), B, k, 1/ǫ) communication, and O(1) rounds.
Proof: By existing work, all costs of Steps 1 to 3 are as claimed. Now consider Step 4. Ob-
serve that the function being computed in Step 4 has inputs and outputs of size bounded by
poly(log(N), log(M), B, k, 1/ǫ) and takes time polynomial in the size of its inputs. In particular,
the instances of norm estimation do not start from scratch with a reference to a or b; rather,
they pick up from the precomputed short sketches R2a and R2b. It follows that this function can
be wrapped with SMC, preserving the computation and communication up to polynomial blowup
in the size of the input and keeping the round complexity to O(1).
We now turn to correctness and privacy. Let Iout denote the set of indices corresponding to the
set Tout of output terms.
Theorem 3.2 Protocol private Euclidean heavy hitters is correct.
Proof: The correctness of Steps 2 and 3 follows from previous work. In Step 4, we first show that
QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)
⊆ Iout.
We assume that 11+ǫ‖rj‖22 ≤ ‖rj‖ 2∼ ≤ ‖rj‖22 always holds; by Proposition 2.15, this happens
with high probability. Thus, if |cij |2 ≥ ǫB(1+ǫ)‖rj‖22, then |cij |2 ≥ ǫB(1+ǫ)‖rj‖22 ≥ ǫB(1+ǫ)‖ri‖ 2∼.
By construction, QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)
⊆ I. A straightforward induction shows that, if j ∈ QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)
, then
iteration j outputs tij and the previous iterations output exactly the set of the j larger terms in I.
By Proposition 2.5, since Iout is a superset of QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)
, if c˜ =
∑
j∈Iout
cijδij , then ‖c˜− c‖22 ≤
(1 + ǫ)‖copt − c‖22, as desired.
Before giving the complete privacy argument, we give a lemma, similar to the above. Suppose
a set P of indices is a subset of another set Q of indices. We will say that P is a prefix of Q if
i ∈ P, tj > ti, and j ∈ Q imply j ∈ P .
Lemma 3.3 The output set Iout is a prefix of QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)2
except with probability 2−k.
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Proof: Note that QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)2
is a subset of I and QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)2
is a prefix of the universe, so QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)2
is a prefix of I. The set Iout is also a prefix of I. It follows that, of the sets Iout and QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)2
,
one is a prefix of the other (or they are equal).
So suppose, toward a contradiction, that QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)2
is a proper prefix of Iout. Let q =∣∣∣QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)2
∣∣∣, so q is the least number such that iq is not in QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)2
. If the protocol halts
before considering q, then Iout ⊆ QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)2
, a contradiction. So, in particular, we may as-
sume that q < B (so the for-loop doesn’t terminate). Then, by definition of QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)2
, we have
|ciq |2 < ǫB(1+ǫ)2
∑
j≥q |cij |2. It follows that
|ciq |2 <
ǫ
B(1 + ǫ)2
∑
i≥q
|ci|2
=
ǫ
B(1 + ǫ)2
‖rq‖22
≤ ǫ
B(1 + ǫ)
‖rq‖ 2∼.
Thus the protocol halts without outputting tq, after outputting exactly the elements in QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)2
.
Finally, we turn to privacy.
Theorem 3.4 Protocol private Euclidean heavy hitters leaks no more than ‖c‖22 and copt.
Proof: With the random inputs R1 and R2 encoded into the output, it is straightforward to show
that Protocol private Euclidean heavy hitters is a private protocol in the traditional sense
that the protocol messages leak no more than the inputs and outputs. This is done by composing
simulators for private-sample-sum and SMC. It remains only to show only that we can simulate
the joint distribution on (c˜, R1, R2) given as simulator-input copt and ‖c‖. We will show that R1
is indistinguishable from independent of the joint distribution of (c˜, R2), which we will simulate
directly.
First, we show that R1 is independent. Except with probability 2
−Ω(k), the intermediate set I
is a superset of QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)2
and the norm estimation is correct. In that case, the protocol outputs a
prefix of QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)2
and we get identical output if I is replaced by QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)2
. Also, QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)2
can
be constructed from copt and ‖c‖2. Since the protocol proceeds without further reference to R1,
we have shown that the pair (c˜, R2) is indistinguishable from being independent of R1. It remains
only to simulate (c˜, R2).
Note that the output c˜ does depend non-negligibly on R2. If |cij |2 is very close to θ‖rj‖22, then
the test |cij |2 < θ‖rj‖ 2∼ in the protocol may succeed with probability non-negligibly far from 0 and
from 1, depending on R2, since the distortion guarantee on ‖rj‖ 2∼ is only the factor (1± ǫ).
The simulator is as follows. Assume that the terms in copt are t0, t1, . . . , tB−1 with decreasing
order, t0 > t1 > · · · > tB−1. For each j ≤ B, compute Ej = ‖c− (t0 + t1 + · · ·+ tj−1)‖22 =
‖c‖22 − ‖t0 + t1 + · · ·+ tj−1‖22 and then run the norm estimation simulator on input Ej and ǫ
to get a sample from the joint distribution (E˜j , R2), where E˜j is a good estimate to Ej . Our
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simulator then outputs tij if |cij |2 ≥ ǫB(1+ǫ) E˜j , and halts, otherwise, following the final for-loop of
the protocol. Call the output of the simulator s˜ =
∑
j tijδij .
Again using the fact that a prefix of QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)2
is output, if j ∈ QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)2
, then ij = j; i.e., the
j’th largest output term is the j’th largest overall, so that, if j is output, we have Ej = ‖rj‖22. Thus
(E˜j , R2) is distributed indistinguishably from (‖rj‖ 2∼, R2). The protocol finishes deterministically
using I and ‖rj‖ 2∼ and the simulator finishes deterministically using QB, ǫB(1+ǫ)2 and E˜j , but, since
the protocol output is identical if I is replaced by QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)2
, the distributions on output (c˜, R2) of
the protocol and (s˜, R2) of the simulator are indistinguishable.
In summary,
Theorem 3.5 Suppose Alice and Bob hold integer-valued vectors a and b in [−M,M ]N , respec-
tively. Let B, k and ǫ be user-defined parameters. Let c = a+ b. Let Topt be the set of the largest
B terms in c. There is an protocol, taking a, b, B k and ǫ as input, given Topt and ‖c‖22, computes
a representation c˜ of at most B terms such that:
• ‖c˜− c‖2 ≤ (1 + ǫ)‖copt − c‖2.
• The algorithm uses poly(N, log(M), B, k, 1/ǫ) time, poly(log(N), log(M), B, k, 1/ǫ) commu-
nication, and O(1) rounds.
• The protocol succeeds with probability 1 − 2−k and leaks only copt and ‖c‖2 with security
parameter k.
Corollary 3.6 With the same hyptotheses and resource bounds, there is a protocol that computes
c˜ and an approximation ‖c˜− c‖∼ to ‖c˜− c‖2 such that 11+ǫ‖c˜− c‖2 ≤ ‖c˜− c‖∼ ≤ ‖c˜− c‖2 and the
protocol leaks only copt and ‖c˜− c‖2.
Proof: Run the main protocol and output also ‖c˜− c‖∼, which is computed in the course of the
main protocol. Note that ‖c˜− c‖22 = ‖c‖22 − ‖c˜‖22 and both ‖c‖2 and c˜ are available to the main
simulator (as input and output, respectively), so we can modify the main simulator to compute
‖c˜− c‖22 as well.
3.2 Extension to Taxicab Heavy Hitters
In this section, we show that our result of Euclidean approximation can be extended to approximate
taxicab heavy hitters.
Lemma 3.7 Let c˜ be the output of private Euclidean heavy hitters. If ‖c− c˜‖2 ≤ (1+ǫ)‖c−
copt‖2, then ‖c− c˜‖1 ≤ (1 +
√
Bǫ)‖c − copt‖1.
Proof: Let (i, ci) be the largest term which is not in QB, ǫ
B(1+ǫ)
. From Theorem 3.5 we know
(
∑
i≤j<B c
2
j )
1
2 <
√
ǫ(
∑
B≤j<N c
2
j)
1
2 . Using the fact that 1√
| supp(x)|
‖x‖1 ≤ ‖x‖2 ≤ ‖x‖1 for any
signal x, we get
1√
B
∑
i≤j<B
|cj | ≤

 ∑
i≤j<B
c2j


1
2
≤ √ǫ

 ∑
B≤j<N
c2j


1
2
≤ √ǫ
∑
B≤j<N
|cj |.
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Thus we have ‖c − c˜‖1 ≤
∑
i≤j<N |cj | =
∑
i≤j<B cj +
∑
B≤j<N |cj | = (
√
ǫB + 1)
∑
B≤j<N |cj | =
(
√
ǫB + 1)‖c− copt‖1.
Theorem 3.8 follows directly:
Theorem 3.8 Suppose Alice and Bob hold integer-valued vectors a and b in [−M,M ]N , respec-
tively. Let B, k and ǫ be userdefined parameters. Let c = a + b. Let Topt be the set of the
largest B terms in c. There is an protocol, taking a, b, M,N,B, k and ǫ as input, and computes a
representation c˜ of at most B terms such that:
• ‖c˜− c‖1 ≤ (1 + ǫ)‖copt − c‖1.
• The algorithm uses poly(N, log(M), B, k, 1/ǫ) time, poly(log(N), log(M), B, k, 1/ǫ) commu-
nication, and O(1) rounds.
• The protocol succeeds with probability 1 − 2−k and leaks only copt and ‖c‖2 with security
parameter k.
3.3 Extension to other Orthonormal Bases
In this section, we consider other orthonormal bases, such as the Fourier basis. Alice and Bob hold
vectors a and b as before, and want the B largest Fourier terms—frequencies and corresponding
coefficient values. The exact problem requires Ω(N) communication, so they settle for an approxi-
mation, namely, they want a B-term Fourier representation c˜ such that ‖c˜− c‖2 ≤ (1+ǫ)‖copt − c‖2,
where copt is the best possible B-term Fourier representation.
We note that a straightforward generalization of our main result solves this problem privately
and efficiently. Alice and Bob locally compute the inverse Fourier transform F−1a and F−1b of their
vectors a and b. Because the Fourier transform is linear, x = F−1c = F−1a+F−1b. Alice and Bob
now want to compute an approximation to the ordinary heavy hitters for the vector x. Suppose
the result is x˜. Then x˜ is the compact collection of Fourier terms and c˜ = Fx˜ is the corresponding
approximate representation of c. By the Parseval equality, since the Fourier basis is orthogonal, for
any y, we have ‖y‖2 = ‖Fy‖2 =
∥∥F−1y∥∥
2
. It follows that ‖c˜− c‖2 ≤ (1+ǫ)‖copt − c‖2 if and only if
‖x˜− x‖2 ≤ (1+ ǫ)‖xopt − x‖2, so the algorithm is correct when transformed to the Fourier domain.
It also follows that leaking ‖c‖2 is equivalent to leaking ‖Fc‖2, so the algorithm is private when
transformed to the Fourier domain. Alice and Bob require the additional overhead of computing a
Fourier transform locally, which fits within the overall budget.
4 Lower Bounds
In this Section, we show some lower bounds for problems related to our main problem, such as
computing an approximation to copt without leaking ‖c‖2. The results are straightforward, but we
include them to motivate the approximation and leakage of the protocols we present.
Theorem 4.1 There is an infinite family of settings of parameters M,N,B, k, ǫ such that any
protocol that computes the Euclidean norm exactly on the sum c of individually-held inputs a and
b, uses communication Ω(N). Similarly, any protocol that computes the exact Heavy Hitters or
computes the qualified set Qc,1,1 exactly uses communication Ω(N).
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Proof: Consider the set disjointness problem, which requires Ω(N) communication [16]. Alice
and Bob hold {0, 1}-valued vectors a and b of length N such that each of a and b has exactly (N/4)
1’s and the supports are either disjoint or intersect in exactly one index. The task is to determine
the intersection size. Then, if c = a + b, we have ‖c‖22 = N/2 or ‖c‖22 = N/2 + 3, depending on
the size of the intersection, so a protocol for ‖c‖2 can be used to solve the set disjointness problem.
Similarly, finding the one largest heavy hitter solves the set disjointness problem.
Now consider vectors of length N + 1 in which indices 0 to N − 1 directly code an instance of
set disjointness as above and index N has a value that is always
√
N/2 + 2. Then |Qc,1,1| = 1 or
|Qc,1,1| = 0 depending on the norm of indices 0 to N − 1, which requires communication Ω(N) to
determine.
The above theorem motivates our study of approximate heavy hitters, for which there are
protocols with exponentially better communication cost than the exact heavy hitters problem. The
next theorem motivates leaking the Euclidean norm, by showing that any efficient protocol for the
approximate heavy hitters problem leaks the Euclidean norm on all instances within a class.
Theorem 4.2 There is an infinite family of settings of parameters M,N,B, k, ǫ such that any
protocol that solves the Euclidean Heavy Hitters problem on the sum c of individually-held inputs a
and b, leaking only copt, uses communication Ω(N). Furthermore, for an infinite class of inputs in
which ‖c‖2 is not constant, any such protocol either computes ‖c‖2 or uses communication Ω(N).
Proof: Consider vectors c of one of two cases, given by random permutations of the following
vectors: 

(2N,
N/2−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, 1, . . . , 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0), (case 1)
(2N,
N/2−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
N,N, . . . ,N, 0, 0, . . . , 0), (case 2).
Fix B = 1 and ǫ ≫ 1/N . A correct protocol finds the top term in case 1. In case 2, it turns out
that the correctness requirement is vacuous, but, fortunately, the privacy requirement is useful. A
protocol leaking only copt must behave indistinguishably in cases 1 and 2 since copt is the same, so
a private protocol reliably finds the the top coefficient in case 2. Since a protocol for case 2 can be
used to solve the set disjointness problem, such a protocol uses Ω(N) bits of communication. In
particular, any protocol either behaves differently on the two cases—thereby computing ‖c‖2 for
inputs in the union of the two cases—or uses communication Ω(N).
Note that the above theorem also shows that it is impossible in some cases to solve the approx-
imate taxicab heavy hitters problem efficiently without leaking the Euclidean norm.
Although the class of inputs above is contrived, the (implied) parameter settings are natural,
i.e., log(M), log(N), B, k, 1/ǫ can be made to be polynomially related, etc.
References
[1] Gagan Aggarwal, Nina Mishra, and Benny Pinkas. Secure computation of the k th-ranked
element. In eurocrypt04, pages 40–55, 2004.
14
[2] N. Alon, P. B. Gibbons, Y. Matias, and M. Szegedy. Tracking join and self-join sizes in limited
storage. J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 64(3):719–747, 2002. Earlier version in PODS ’99.
[3] N. Alon, Y. Matias, and M. Szegedy. The space complexity of approximating the frequency
moments. J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 58(1):137–147, 1999. Earlier version in STOC ’96.
[4] A. Beimel, P. Carmi, K. Nissim, and E. Weinreb. Private approximation of search problems.
In Proc. 38th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pages 119–128, 2006.
[5] M. Ben-Or, S. Goldwasser, and A. Wigderson. Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic
fault-tolerant distributed computation. In Proc. 20th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory
of Computing, pages 1–10. ACM Press, 1988.
[6] C. Cachin, S. Micali, and M. Stadler. Computationally private information retrieval with
polylogarithmic communication. In Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’99, LNCS
1592, pages 404–414. Springer-Verlag, 1999.
[7] S. Chawla, C. Dwork, F. McSherry, A. Smith, and H. Wee. Toward privacy in public databases.
In Proc. Second Theory of Cryptography Conference, pages 363–385, 2005.
[8] B. Chor, O. Goldreich, E. Kushilevitz, and M. Sudan. Private information retrieval. Journal
of the ACM, 45:965–981, 1998. Earlier version in FOCS ’95.
[9] G. Cormode and S. Muthukrishnan. What’s hot and what’s not: Tracking most frequent items
dynamically. In Proc. ACM Principles of Database Systems, pages 296–306, 2003.
[10] J. Feigenbaum, Y. Ishai, T. Malkin, K. Nissim, M. Strauss, and R. N.Wright. Secure multiparty
computation of approximations. Transactions on Algorithms, 2006. To appear. Earliar version
in ICALP 2001.
[11] M. Freedman, K. Nissim, and B. Pinkas. Efficient private matching and set intersection. In
Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’04, LNCS 3027, pages 1–19. Springer-Verlag, 2004.
[12] A. Gilbert, S. Guha, P. Indyk, Y. Kotidis, S. Muthukrishnan, and M. Strauss. Fast, small-space
algorithms for approximate histogram maintenance. In Proc. 34th Annual ACM Symposium
on the Theory of Computing, pages 389–398, 2002.
[13] S. Halevi, E. Kushilevitz, R. Krauthgamer, and K. Nissim. Private approximations of NP-hard
functions. In Proc. 33th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pages 550–559,
2001.
[14] P. Indyk and D. P. Woodruff. Polylogarithmic private approximations and efficient matching.
In Proc. Third Theory of Cryptography Conference, pages 245–264, 2006.
[15] E. Kushilevitz and Y. Mansour. Learning decision trees using the fourier sprectrum. In Proc.
23th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pages 455–464, 1991.
[16] E. Kushilevitz and N. Nisan. Communication complexity. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
[17] E. Kushilevitz and R. Ostrovsky. Replication is NOT needed: SINGLE database,
computationally-private information retrieval. In Proc. 38th IEEE Symposium on Founda-
tions of Computer Science, pages 364–373, 1997.
15
[18] Y. Lindell and B. Pinkas. Privacy preserving data mining. J. Cryptology, 15(3):177–206, 2002.
Earlier version in Crypto ’00.
[19] M. Naor and K. Nissim. Communication preserving protocols for secure function evaluation.
In Proc. 33th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pages 590–599, 2001.
[20] A. Yao. Protocols for secure computation. In Proc. 23rd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science, pages 160–164, 1982.
16
